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  THAT’S THE TICKET:  ARGUING FOR A 
NARROWER INTERPRETATION OF THE 
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Interpretation of the Exceptions Clause in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 7 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 126 (2012), at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents 





In 1994, Congress enacted the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
(DPPA, or the Act)
1
 out of concern that states were disclosing personal 
information contained in motor vehicle records to parties who often 
used it for illegal and harmful purposes.
2
 Specifically, the highly 
publicized murder of a young actress by an obsessed fan who obtained 
her unlisted address this way, and other incidents of stalking and 
harassment, provided the impetus for the legislation.
3
  
DPPA prohibits state departments of motor vehicles from selling 
or otherwise “disclosing” certain personal information—including 
name, address, social security or driver’s license number, and various 
                                                 
*J.D., May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1
 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721-2725 (West 1994). 
2
 139 CONG. REC. E2747-48 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
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other “identifying” information—without the individual’s express 
consent.
4
 However, the Act contains a fairly expansive list of 
exceptions which pertain mainly to safety, government functions, and 
litigation.
5
 Disagreement over what is permissible under these 
exceptions, contained in subsection (b) of the Act, has been the source 
of recent litigation,
6
 including Senne v. Village of Palatine, considered 
by the Seventh Circuit in 2011.
7
 In Senne, the plaintiff brought a 
putative class-action against a police department alleging that its 
practice of including detailed personal information, including name 
and address, on parking tickets placed on motorists’ vehicles on public 
streets violated his rights under the Act.
8
 In the since-vacated decision, 
the majority ruled this was a “permissible use” under the statute’s 
exceptions.
9




The congressional record makes clear that the purpose of DPPA 
was to prevent the tragic consequences that can occur when sensitive 
                                                 
4
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a), 2725(3). 
5
 Id. at § 2721(b). 
6
 § 2724(a) of DPPA allows for a private cause of action. 
7
 Senne v. Village of Palatine, 645 F.3d 919, vacated, reh’g en banc granted 




 Id. In an opinion issued Aug. 6, 2012, the full court reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of Senne’s case and the three-judge panel decision affirming it.  
See Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243, Aug. 6, 2012. Writing for the 
majority, Judge Ripple, who had dissented from the earlier decision, held that the 
plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts that Palatine’s disclosure of his information 
“exceeded that permitted by [DPPA].” Remanding the case to the lower court, the 
majority concluded that  “…the text of the statute limits the content of authorized 
disclosures of protected information in motor vehicle records through its 
requirement, clear on its face, that any such disclosure be made ‘[f]or use’ in 
effecting a particular purpose exempted by the Act” — and Palatine had yet to show 
how it used all of the disclosed information toward that end. Id. at 19. 
10
 En banc hearing oral arguments, Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243 
(7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HM0VFZXG.mp3 (audio). 
 
2
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personal information gets into the wrong hands.
11
 However, the 
Seventh Circuit and other federal courts have generally construed the 
Act’s language in favor of public and private entities that claim to be 
disclosing and using private information pursuant to the enumerated 
exceptions, and against the drivers whose privacy and safety the Act 
was created to protect. These courts have broadly interpreted the 
exceptions clause and given wide latitude to would-be “disclosers” 
and “users” in a way that frustrates the purpose of the Act.
12
 To date, 
no cases have been brought alleging serious crime or violence 
resulting from a “permissible” disclosure under the Act, but the 
litigation indicates the exceptions are being exploited to provide some 
private and state actors a loophole to circumvent the law’s restrictions 
and to use individuals’ personal information in ways Congress never 
intended. 
Even areas of the statute that would seem to be unambiguous—for 
example, distinguishing between the original “disclosing” (presumably 
done by the state) and subsequent “redisclosures” by recipients of the 
information and setting forth different requirements for both
13
—do not 
appear to be helping plaintiffs in trying to assert their rights under the 




This Comment proposes that the plain language of the subsection 
(b) exceptions clause in DPPA is ambiguous. Therefore, courts should 
adopt a much narrower interpretation of what disclosures and uses of 
private information are permissible under the subsection consistent 
with congressional intent. For instance, the Senne three-judge and en 
banc panels divided over the question of whether the exception 
                                                 
11
 See Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2. 
12
 For example, the 11th Circuit held that a law firm fell under the 
“investigation in anticipation of litigation” permissible-use exception when it 
obtained personal information on more than 200,000 drivers from the Florida motor 
vehicle department in order to contact some of them as “possible witnesses” in its 
fraud action against several auto dealerships. See Thomas v. George, 525 F.3d 1107 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
13
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(c). 
14
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 924-25. 
3
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providing: “for use in connection with any . . . criminal [or] 
administrative . . . proceeding . . . including service of process”
15
 
meant that a law enforcement agency may use personal information 
from state motor vehicle records only to identify and contact (i.e., 
serve or arrest) an individual, or whether the agency may “use” this 
information in any conceivable way it chooses so long as its ultimate 
purpose is service of process.
16
 As Judge Diane Wood suggested at the 
en banc hearing, does the latter interpretation mean the agency can 
even post it on the Internet?
17
 This would seem to not only frustrate 
the purpose of DPPA, but to interpret the language of the Act in a way 
that leads to an absurd result. 
This Comment argues that, consistent with congressional goals in 
enacting DPPA, protecting drivers’ privacy and safety is not 
incompatible with efficient government administration and that courts 
should employ a more restrictive interpretation of the terms “use” and 
“disclose” as contained in the Act. Part I of this Comment reviews 
DPPA’s legislative purpose and history as set forth in the congressional 
record, federal case law interpreting the subsection (b) exceptions, and 
a recent district court opinion calling for a narrow construction. Part II 
returns to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of subsection (b) in the since-
vacated Senne v. Village of Palatine—including a powerful dissenting 
opinion by Judge Ripple that this Comment argues should control—
and the February 2012 en banc rehearing. Part III ties together court 
opinions addressing informational privacy, the “plain meaning” rule of 
statutory interpretation, and Seventh Circuit precedent to support a 
narrower interpretation. This Comment concludes by proposing that 
until the United States Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional 
privacy interest in personal information or until Congress revisits and 
amends DPPA, courts should read the plain language of the exceptions 
clause in the context of the statute’s purpose.   
 
                                                 
15
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b). 
16
 Senne, 645 F.3d 919 et seq.; en banc hearing, supra note 10. 
17
 En banc hearing, supra note 10. 
4
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A. Senne v. Village of Palatine 
 
The case that the Seventh Circuit was asked to review in early 
2011 began with a routine parking ticket issued the previous summer.
18
 
In August 2010, Jason Senne received a twenty-dollar citation for 
parking in a restricted area overnight in the Village of Palatine, 
Illinois.
19
 Compounding the consternation provoked by such an 
unpleasant discovery, Senne realized that, per the Village’s policy, 
detailed personal information including his name, home address, 
driver’s license number, date of birth, and even his height and weight 
were electronically printed on the ticket that had been sitting on his 
windshield for nearly six hours.
20
 Palatine’s attorney later conceded 
that the Village is alone among Illinois jurisdictions in printing this 
extent of personal information on parking tickets, although some 
jurisdictions include the registered vehicle owner’s name and home 
address.
21
   
Senne filed a putative class-action complaint against the Village in 
federal district court alleging that this practice violated his privacy 
rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), and that it 
did not fall under any of the statute’s exceptions.
22
 Moreover, Senne 
maintained, the citation that the personal information is printed on 
doubles as a return envelope for the payment, forcing individuals to 
“unwittingly” disclose it once more to others who come into contact 
                                                 
18




 Id. at 921. 
21
 En banc hearing, supra note 10 (counsel for Village explained that ten other 
northern Illinois municipalities include a registered owner’s name on a parking 
ticket, six include name and address, and one other also includes driver’s license 
number). See also Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 
1991) (most jurisdictions, including the city of Chicago, identify the vehicle owner 
on a ticket only by tag number).  
22
 Complaint, ¶ 10-28, Senne v. Village of Palatine, 645 F.3d 919 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 27, 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-05434), 2011 WL 3459438. 
5
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with it once it is sent by mail.
23
 He accused the Village of “facilitating 




District Court Judge Matthew F. Kennelly granted Palatine’s 
motion to dismiss, holding that the parking ticket was not even a 
“disclosure” under the Act, and if it were, it was permissible under the 
exception allowing use by a law enforcement agency in carrying out 
its functions.
25
 The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s 
disclosure determination but still found Palatine’s policy a permissible 





B.   Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
 
Prior to DPPA’s enactment in 1994, motor vehicle departments in 
roughly 34 states routinely sold private information of licensed drivers 
to marketers and other businesses, as well as to any member of the 
public who requested it, for a nominal fee.
27
 Indeed, some states had 
garnered substantial revenue from such disclosures.
28
 By the early 
1990s, it was recognized that this practice resulted not only in an 
invasion of personal privacy, but occasionally in criminal acts.
29
 The 
passage of DPPA was inspired by several tragic incidents in which 
individuals were harassed or killed by people who obtained their 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 5. 
24
 Id. at 6. 
25
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 921; also see 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1). 
26
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 923-24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). 
27
 139 CONG. REC. S14381 (Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Warner: 
“Citizens who wish to operate a motor vehicle have no choice but to register with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles and they should do so with full confidence that the 
information they provide will not be disclosed indiscriminately.”); Rep. Moran 
statement, supra note 2: “[V]ery few Americans realize that by registering their car 
or obtaining a driver's license through the DMV, they are surrendering their personal 
and private information to anyone who wants to obtain it.”). 
28
 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-44 (2000). 
29
 Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2. 
6
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personal information from state motor vehicle departments.
30
 Most 
famously, the television actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot and killed 
by an obsessed fan outside her Los Angeles apartment after he used 
her motor vehicle records to find her.
31
 Lesser-known crimes were also 
cited by congressional sponsors. An Arizona woman was murdered by 
a man who acquired her address the same way.
32
 In Iowa, teenagers 
wrote down license tag numbers of expensive cars, obtained the 
owners’ home addresses from the state, and burglarized the homes.
33
 A 
California man sent threatening letters to five young women whose 
addresses he located through the DMV.
34
   
DPPA was a bipartisan effort included in omnibus crime 
legislation passed in 1993 as the “Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act.”
35
 It was sponsored in the U.S. House of 
Representatives by Rep. Moran and in the U.S. Senate by Democratic 
Senator Barbara Boxer (Cal.) and Republican Senator John Warner 
(Va.).
36
 Its stated purpose was “to protect the personal privacy and 





 1.  Devil is in The Details 
 
The Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., provides in 
pertinent part: 
 






 Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2. 
33
 Id.; Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2. 
34
 Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2. 
35
 Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 136 (West 
1994). 
36
 139 CONG. REC. S15745, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Warner); Rep. 
Moran statement, supra note 2. 
37
 139 CONG. REC. S15764 (Nov. 16, 1993) (emphasis added).  
7
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Prohibition on release and use of certain personal information 
from State motor vehicle records 
(a) In general.—A State department of motor vehicles, and 
any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not 
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any 
person or entity: 
 (1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
2725(3), about any individual obtained by the department in 
connection with a motor vehicle record, except as provided in 




“Personal information” is defined as “information that identifies 
an individual, including . . . photograph, social security number, driver 
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), 
telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not 




After describing permitted disclosures for safety and theft 
purposes, motor vehicle emissions, and product recalls and advisories, 
the Act enumerates fourteen specific exceptions permitting disclosure, 
with (b)(1) and (b)(4) being the subject of most of the private action 
against government actors, including Senne:   
 
 (b) Permissible uses.—Personal information referred to 
in subsection (a) . . . may be disclosed as follows: 
 (1) For use by any government agency, including any 
court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its 
functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a 
Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions. 
 (4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, 
administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or 
local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, 
including the service of process, investigation in anticipation 
                                                 
38
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a)(1). 
39
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3).  
8
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of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments 





The remaining exceptions include use related to research 
activities, insurance claims investigation and underwriting, providing 
notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles, commercial 
driver’s licenses, operating toll facilities, and several others requiring 
the express consent of the driver, including bulk distribution for 
surveys, marketing or solicitations by businesses.
41
  
Subsection (c) of the Act pertains to resale and redisclosure by 
“authorized recipients” who have acquired the information from a 
state without express consent: 
 
 (c) Resale or redisclosure.—Any authorized recipient . . .  
that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by 
this chapter must keep for a period of 5 years records 
identifying each person or entity that receives information 
and the permitted purpose for which the information will be 




These common-sense exceptions were an acknowledgement by 
Congress that there are many legitimate purposes for state disclosure 
of personal identifying information without the owner’s express 
consent, particularly to other government entities. But the language in 
subsection (b) is open to broad and varying interpretation. For 
instance, (b)(1): “for use by a government agency [such as law 
enforcement] in carrying out its functions”
43
 may be interpreted as 
disclosure by the state to an agency so it can simply locate or 
communicate with an individual for a specific reason, such as 
conducting an investigation or issuing a summons. But some interpret 
                                                 
40




 Id. § 2721(c). 
43
 Id. § 2721(b). 
9
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“for use by” as any use at all the agency chooses to make, regardless 
of whether the use exceeds that which is necessary or even reasonable 
to effectuate the agency’s purpose.
44
   
Any person who knowingly violates DPPA may be subject to a 
criminal fine.
45
 Section 2724(a) of the Act allows for a private right of 
civil action by persons whose information is improperly disclosed 
against one who “knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses personal 
information … for a purpose not permitted under this chapter.”
46
 In 
addition to actual damages, the Act allows for punitive damages “upon 
proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law.”
47
 
States themselves are excluded from the definition of “person” for 
purposes of civil actions, but municipalities and law enforcement 
agencies are not.
48
 Individual state actors also are “persons” who may 
be sued.
49
 Courts have held that to “knowingly” disclose means only 
that the discloser knew he was disclosing private information, not that 
he knew he was disclosing it for an impermissible use.
50
 In Thomas v. 
George, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the private action clause as 
requiring a plaintiff asserting a violation of DPPA to prove 





                                                 
44
 See Senne, 645 F.3d at 923-24. 
45
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2723(a) . 
46
 18 U.S.C.A. § 2724(a) . 
47
 Id. § 2724(a)(b)(2). 
48




 Senne, 645 F.3d at 923; Pichler v. Unite, 542 F.3d 380, 397 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
51
 See Thomas v. George et. al., 525 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that permissible use under DPPA is not an affirmative defense). Impermissible use is 
often difficult if not impossible for a plaintiff to prove, especially in cases such as 
Thomas, where defendants often solely possess knowledge of their true intentions, 
and where a defendant claims attorney-client privilege or some other privilege 
preventing disclosure of crucial documents. 
10
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C. DPPA Case Law 
 
In Reno v. Condon, the United States Supreme Court held DPPA 
constitutional under a Tenth Amendment challenge.
52
 Condon and 
many of the cases brought in the years shortly after passage of the Act 
centered on federalism challenges by various states as to whether 
Congress could even impose such a restriction on them.
53
 Besides 
Condon, there are only a handful of DPPA cases that have been 
decided above the district court level, including several by the Seventh 
Circuit.
54
 However, over the last decade, individuals claiming 
violations of their rights under the Act have increasingly brought 
private actions to enforce those rights. 
In Pichler v. Unite, the Third Circuit held that union organizing 
was not a permissible use under the b(4) “investigation in anticipation 
of litigation” exception when a labor union contacted potential recruits 
whose license tag numbers it had collected from cars in a parking lot.
55
 
However, the Eleventh Circuit found the same exception to apply to a 
law firm that obtained information on 284,000 licensed Florida drivers 
because some might be “potential witnesses” in its lawsuit against an 
automotive dealership, even though it would never contact a large 
number of them.
56
 In Thomas, the law firm claimed it needed the 
records in order to obtain evidence of custom and practice in its unfair 
                                                 
52
 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (also finding that Congress enacted 
DPPA under its Commerce Clause authority). 
53
 See Deborah F. Buckman, J.D., Validity, Construction, and Application of 
the Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 183 A.L.R. FED. 37 (2003). 
54
 See, e.g., Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
DPPA’s restrictions on access to information in public records does not violate the 
First Amendment (distinguishing from the Freedom of Information Act) and that it 
also does not implicate the 11th Amendment because it excludes states from being 
sued by private parties). The Seventh Circuit also held that DPPA affords a private 
right of action to individuals whose information is improperly disclosed, but not to 
those who seek disclosure. See McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(plaintiff was in the business of buying cars auctioned to satisfy mechanics’ liens 
and wished to obtain information on the vehicles’ owners).   
55
 Pichler v. Unite, 542 F.3d 380, 395-96 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
56
 Thomas, 525 F.3d at 1114-15 . 
11
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 The court concluded that it did not matter that 
the defendant actually used only a small number of the records it 
acquired.
58
 (In contrast, Wemhoff v. District of Columbia held that the 
litigation exception did not apply to an attorney who tried to obtain the 
identities of motorists caught by red-light cameras in order to bring a 




 1. Bulk Distribution 
 
Some of the most troubling DPPA permissible-use interpretations 
have involved the bulk sale of information to private businesses that 
resell it. In Russell v. Choicepoint Services, Inc., a Louisiana district 
court held that DPPA permitted an electronic database owner to obtain 
records from state DMVs in order to resell them to third parties that 
have a “permissible use,” even if it had no such use itself.
60
 Similarly, 
in Young v. West Publishing Corp., a Florida district court held that 
DPPA does not require a commercial entity to have an independent 
permissible use for information in order to qualify as an “authorized 
recipient”; it can resell or redisclose information for purposes of legal 
research.
61
   
In Welch v. Jones, another Florida district court decision, the court 
held that DPPA allowed the state to sell drivers’ personal information 
in bulk to a company that sold it on the Internet, because the 
company’s subscribers had to identify themselves and swear under 
penalty of perjury they would use the information for one of the 
fourteen statutory exceptions.
62
 The company, Public Data, had 




 Id. at 1115.  
59
 Wemhoff v. District of Columbia, 887 A.2d 1004 (D.C. 2005). 
60
 Russell v. Choicepoint Svcs. Inc.,  300 F.Supp.2d 450, 451, 455 
 (E.D. La. 2004). 
61
 Young v. West Publ’g. Corp., 724 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
62
 Welch v. Jones, 770 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2011). In a remarkable 
display of faith in business and personal ethics, the court scoffed at the plaintiff’s 
argument that a Public Data subscribing customer might falsely claim a permissible 
use because: (1) a subscriber would not likely pay a “substantial sum” for the records 
12
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purchased drivers’ information from the state of Florida to resell to its 
customers.
63
 In a startlingly broad reading of the exceptions clause, the 
court found Public Data had properly obtained the information 
pursuant to the §2721(b)(3) exception “for use ... by a legitimate 
business” to verify a customer’s identity,
64
 even if it may never need 
the information and even if the people whose information was 
obtained never actually became “customers.”
65
 The court reasoned that 
its interpretation was a “more comfortable” reading of the “for use” 
language in the exceptions clause, “especially in a statute imposing 
civil liabilities and fines,” and concluded that if it led to improper use 
of information, it was up to Congress to correct it.
66
   
 
 2.  Privacy in Public Information: Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong 
 
In support of its holding, the Welch court cited Taylor v. Acxiom, a 
2010 Fifth Circuit decision that also broadly interpreted the Act to 
allow the bulk disclosure of information to commercial entities that 
resell it without making permissible use of the information 
themselves.
67
 The court held that such “bulk obtainment” did not 
                                                                                                                   
without a legitimate purpose, and (2) it was risking prosecution for perjury if it did 
so. 
63
 Id. at 1255. 
64
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(3) (allowing disclosure “for use in the normal 
course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, 
but only (A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the 
individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors; and (B) if such 
information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the 
correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal 
remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the 
individual.”). 
65
 Welch, 770 F.Supp.2d at 1259 (“Had Congress intended §2721(b) to require 
actual use—rather than only a purpose to use when appropriate—it could have said 
so. And had Congress intended information to be disclosed only for an individual 
transaction, rather than in bulk, it could have said that, too. But it did not.”) 
(emphasis added). 
66
 Id. at 1260-61. 
67
 Id. at 1259; Taylor v. Acxiom, 612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010). 
13
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violate DPPA and justified its holding by misinterpreting the 
§2721(b)(11) requirement of express consent for bulk disclosure of 
information for marketing purposes
68
 as therefore allowing bulk 
disclosure without express consent for any of the other permissible 
purposes a purchaser may have.
69
 The court described the Act as a 
“crime-fighting measure” and cited the legislative record to support its 
conclusion that DPPA was aimed only at preventing victimization 
from crime: “The totality of the legislative history clearly reflects that 
Congress did not intend to suppress legitimate business uses of motor 
vehicle records” (emphasis in original).
70
 
However, the record indicates that in passing DPPA, Congress 
was concerned not only with physical safety but with personal privacy, 
apart from violent or threatening criminal acts.
71
 Indeed, the very 
name of the Act, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, demonstrates 
                                                 
68
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(12) (“for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing 
or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom 
such personal information pertains”). 
69
 Taylor, 612 F.3d at 335 (“Of the fourteen expressly listed permissible uses, 
only once does Congress limit a permissible use to individual motor records. And of 
these … only once does Congress limit a permissible use to bulk distribution. For the 
remaining twelve permissible uses, the statute seems to have more than one 
reasonable interpretation: individual release, bulk release, or both”(internal citations 
omitted; emphasis in original)). 
70
 Id. at 336. The court noted that the purpose of the statute supports the 
conclusion that Congress intended bulk distribution. However, the court’s reasoning 
seems to overlook the possibility that the information could be improperly obtained 
by someone posing as a legitimate purchaser in order to commit a crime. 
71
 See, e.g., Sen. Moran statement, supra note 2: “By enacting this legislation, 
Congress will reaffirm that privacy is not a Democratic or Republican issue, but a 
basic human right to which every person is entitled”; Sen. Warner statement, supra 
note 27: “In today's world, both personal privacy and personal safety are 
disappearing and this legislation would help to protect both. The bill incorporates the 
intentions of the 1974 Privacy Act, which addresses the collection of personal 
information by Federal agencies. The bill also includes the recommendations of the 
1977 Privacy Protection Study Commission report.”). See also 139 CONG. REC. 
S15764, supra note 37: “The purpose of this Act is to protect the personal privacy 
and safety of licensed drivers consistent with the legitimate needs of business and 
government”(emphasis added).  
14
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that the intent of Congress was not only preventing crime. A further 
sign of this is that in 1999, Congress amended DPPA to prohibit direct 
marketers from obtaining personal information from motor vehicle 
records without a person’s express consent.
72
 Previously, a person had 
to actively opt out of this type of disclosure when applying for a 
license.
73
 This amendment has been viewed as a legislative recognition 
that individuals have an expectation of privacy in information they 
voluntarily disclose to the government that supersedes the interests of 





 3. Wiles v. Worldwide: Call for a Narrow Interpretation of 
Permissible Uses 
 
At least one federal court has called for a narrower interpretation 
of the exceptions clause in DPPA in light of its ambiguity.
75
 In Wiles v. 
Worldwide Information Inc., a Western District of Missouri court 
accused the Fifth Circuit of misapplying the expressio unius maxim
76
 
in Taylor v. Acxiom and criticized the reasoning in that case and in 
Russell v. Choicepoint.
 77
 The Wiles case also dealt with a state’s sale 
of its entire driver’s license database to a reseller that did not itself use 
the information.
78
 The decision appears to be the first to hold that 
under DPPA, nondisclosure of personal information is the default rule 
                                                 
72
 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 1025 (1994) 
(amended 1999). 
73
 See Maureen Maginnis, Maintaining the Privacy of Personal Information: 
The DPPA and the Right of Privacy. 51 S.C. L. REV. 807, 811 (2000).  
74
 Id. at n.33.  
75
 Wiles v. Worldwide Info. Inc., 809 F.Supp.2d 1059 (W.D. Mo. 2011). 
76
 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: “The expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another.” BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 1991). 
77
 Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d at1069-1072. 
78
 Id. at 1063-64 (a customer of the reseller could then obtain the entire license 
database so long as it claimed a permissible purpose to access just one of the names 
in it). 
15
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and not the exception.
79
 Writing for the majority, Judge Nanette K. 
Laughrey observed: “[N]owhere does the DPPA enumerate any 
‘prohibited purposes’ or ‘prohibited uses.’ Rather, the statute generally 
prohibits all but the fourteen permissible uses enumerated in section 
2721(b).”
80
 As such, the judge concluded, a recipient should have to 
show a specific permissible use before obtaining information on any 
individual, which a reseller, such as the defendant, could not do.
81
   
Judge Laughrey observed that the court’s holding deviated from 
the majority of federal courts that have considered the issue: “The 
majority of courts reason that so long as the private information is not 
actually used in a ‘prohibited’ manner there is no violation of  
DPPA . . . [y]et the DPPA never explicitly lists any prohibited uses; 
rather it generally prohibits all but . . . fourteen . . . uses.”
82
 To 
illustrate the irony of this reasoning, Judge Laughrey proposed that a 
tow truck operator could obtain an entire license database, including 
social security numbers, because one day it might need to tow the car 
of an individual in the database.
83
   
Judge Laughrey’s opinion also seems to be one of the few to 
consider DPPA’s legislative purpose and history and not just its plain 
language.
84
 Having reviewed both, she concluded that “Congress did 
not intend the DPPA to authorize this widespread dissemination of 
private information untethered from the very uses that Congress listed 
                                                 
79
 Id. at 1066. 
80
 Id. at 1073. 
81
 Id. (reasoning that the §2721(c) language limiting redisclosure by 
“authorized recipients” could only mean Congress intended these recipients to be 
individuals or entities qualified themselves to receive information under one of the 
fourteen exceptions; to read the section otherwise leads to the absurd result “that 
resellers could obtain all of the personal information in the database simply by 
calling themselves resellers, while everyone else—including law enforcement—
would have to justify their receipt . . . under the 2721(b) exception applicable to 
them.” Congress could not have intended such a “gaping hole” in the statute). 
82
 Id. at 1061, 1063. 
83
 Id. at 1063. 
84
 See id. at 1065 (“the [c]ourt interprets the DPPA in accordance with its plain 
language and legislative purpose”); see also id. at 1066-68. 
16
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 Judge Laughrey concluded that the “overriding 
purpose” of the statute was to protect drivers’ privacy, made plain by 
its title: the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
86
 As such, Congress could 
not have intended greater latitude for an authorized recipient to 
disclose upon resale or redisclosure than the state has upon initial 
disclosure: “Congress, like its constituents, feared that private 
information widely circulated in vast databases would be intentionally 
or inadvertently leaked . . . [n]or would there be a viable way to know 
whether unscrupulous individuals within recipient organizations were 




Finally, the Wiles opinion advanced a conclusion that can be 
applied to most cases alleging violations of DPPA by any recipient, 
government or private: “The interpretation most consistent with 
Congressional intent requires that disclosure of personal information 




II.   SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF DPPA EXCEPTIONS 
CLAUSE 
 
In most of the litigation surrounding DPPA, the courts have 
addressed federalism issues and disclosure of personal information to 
private parties, but the issue of disclosure to or use by public entities 
has seldom arisen.
89
 While the district court in Senne found Palatine’s 
ticketing policy permissible under the subsection (b)(1) “government 
agency function” exception,
90
 the Seventh Circuit majority instead 
found for the Village under (b)(4): “service of process” in an 
administrative proceeding.
91
 On appeal the plaintiff had argued that 
                                                 
85
 Id. at 1063. 
86
 Id. at 1068. 
87
 Id. at 1068-69. 
88
 Id. at 1076. 
89
 See generally Buckman, supra note 53. 
90
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 921. 
91
 Id. at 923-24. 
17
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the Village’s public display of his information was “not inextricably 
tied to its ability to issue, serve, or enforce parking citations.”
92
 In 
affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Seventh Circuit majority 
concluded that subsection (b)(4) does not dictate “best practices” to 
government agencies, but instead gives them carte blanche to use the 





 A. Plaintiff’s Case: The Meaning of “Use” in DPPA 
 
The crux of Senne’s argument centered around the meaning of 
“use” and “disclose” as provided in subsection (b).
94
 He argued that 
publicly posting his private information on a parking ticket was not 
among the “uses” contemplated by Congress when it drafted the 
exceptions clause; specifically, Palatine’s disclosure to a stranger was 
not the same as a “use” by Palatine in carrying out a law enforcement 
function.
95
 He contended that Palatine violated DPPA by disclosing his 
information “to persons or entities outside its law enforcement 
agency.”
96
 Senne further argued that Palatine’s disclosure was more 
dangerous than those that facilitated the notorious incidents preceding 
DPPA, because an individual did not have to take any steps to obtain 
his information—the Village made it “immediately available” on a 
public street,
97
 thus “facilitating criminal activity.”
98
 The ticketing 
policy “is priceless to identity thieves” who get “a treasure trove of 
                                                 
92
 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir. 
Dec. 31, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020493.  
93
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 924. 
94
 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, 14-17, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir. 
Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020495. 
95
 Id. at 6-7 (arguing that “obtain,” “use,” and “disclose” as defined in the law 
were distinct acts that each required a permissible use independent of each other). 
96
 Id. at 6.  
97
 Id. at 8. 
98
 Id. at 19. 
18
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free information” from the Village,
99
 made all the more eye-catching 
by the bright yellow form of the citation.
100
 
Senne also argued that the Village was making a redisclosure of 
his information as defined under the Act, which is further restricted by 
subsection (c):
101
 “Does Palatine have any greater right to disclose 
‘personal information’ it receives from ‘motor vehicle records’ than 
the [states] that collect the information have themselves?” he asked.
102
 
He argued that if someone made a direct in-person request to the 
Village, it would never release to them the same information which it 
knowingly prints on a parking citation and “slap[s] . . . on the 
windshield,” viewable by any passerby.
103
 “Palatine’s actions are a 
clear violation of the letter and spirit of DPPA and the core . . . 
principles [on] which all privacy laws are based.”
104
 
In its reply, Palatine argued that the only person alleged to have 
actually seen the ticket was Senne himself, and that it did not 
“knowingly” place the ticket on his windshield for third parties to 
use.
105
 Palatine argued the ticket was an administrative complaint.
106
 
Noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized parking tickets 
as complaints,
107
 it defended its practice: “the relevant inquiry [under 
DPPA] is not whether a defendant used the information permissibly, 
but whether he had a permissible purpose.”
108
 But does the law so 
distinguish between use and purpose? Only the Third Circuit seems to 
                                                 
99
 Id. at 9 (noting that in the United States, a driver’s license is the primary 
source of identification). 
100
 Id. at 12-13. 
101
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a)(c). 
102
 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 94 at 15 (also arguing “if the 
Illinois secretary of state can’t post personal information from motor vehicles, 
neither can Palatine.” Id. at 18).  
103
 Id. at 19. 
104
 Id. at 27. 
105
 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 1, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir. 
Dec. 17, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020494. 
106
 Id. at 15-19.  
107
 Id. at 16. 
108
 Id. at 20. 
19
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have distinguished “permissible use” from “permissible purpose,” 
finding the fact that a party seeking information may have a 
permissible purpose in doing so does not make any use it then makes 
of the information permissible.
109
   
 
B. Majority’s Analysis 
 
The three-judge panel of Easterbrook, Ripple, and Flaum 
unanimously reversed the district court’s finding that the parking ticket 
was not a disclosure as defined in the Act, but split over whether it was 
permitted by the statute.
110
 Writing for himself and Judge Easterbrook, 
Judge Joel M. Flaum explained that in examining the plain language of 
the statute to discern legislative intent, the court had to look at the 
words and their meaning in the context of the statutory scheme.
111
 
However, this was not borne out by the reasoning that followed. 
Significantly, nowhere in the opinion did the majority discuss the 
policy or purpose behind DPPA.
112
 
After citing the subsection (b)(4) exception “for use in connection 
with . . . service of process,” Judge Flaum noted that a parking citation 
constitutes service of legal process under both Illinois law and Palatine 
                                                 
109
 Pilcher, 542 F.3d at 395. Does the assumption that a person has violated the 
law (by getting a parking citation) make it more acceptable for a governmental entity 
to “use” the information in ways it could not otherwise? Palatine in its answer brief 
referred to the plaintiff as a “ticket scofflaw” who was looking to skirt his fine and 
get a “payday.” Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 105 at 5. (This was 
factually erroneous as: (1) plaintiff claimed he did pay his fine, and (2) a scofflaw is 
generally defined not as a person who receives a fine, but who fails to pay one; See 
Dictionary.com: “a person who flouts the law, especially one who fails to pay fines 
owed,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scofflaw?s=t. Plaintiff claimed he 
was not aware he was parking illegally. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra 
note 92 at 6.) The implication is that plaintiff deserved the public shaming for 
parking where he was not supposed to, and therefore had no right to complain about 
a violation of privacy. 
110
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 925 (Ripple, J., dissenting).  
111
 Id. at 922. 
112
 Id., et seq. 
20
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 “Because affixing the parking citation to 
Senne’s vehicle constituted service of process, disclosing personal 
information in the citation did not violate the DPPA,” he concluded.
114
 
Judge Flaum rejected the idea that the language in subsection (b) is 
ambiguous and noted the irony that as the Act is written, a permissible 
use could constitute an unlawful disclosure of otherwise protected 
information.
115
 He also rejected Senne’s arguments about the 
recklessness and senselessness of Palatine’s policy: “The statute does 
not ask whether the service of process reveals no more information 
than necessary to effect service, and so neither do we.”
116
 
The majority similarly rejected Senne’s redisclosure argument, 
stating that even if the act of putting the citation in the mail amounted 
to a redisclosure, it would be Senne himself doing the redisclosing and 
not the Village.
117
 This analysis fails to consider the idea that the initial 
disclosure of the information was made by the state to Palatine as an 
“authorized recipient,” and Palatine’s act of placing the information in 
a public place was not also a disclosure, but a redisclosure that should 




C. Judge Ripple’s Dissent 
 
In an impassioned dissent, Judge Kenneth Ripple accused the 
majority of “significantly frustrating” the intent and purpose of 
Congress.
119
 Calling Palatine’s disclosure “excessive,” he asserted that 
                                                 
113
 Id. at 923, citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 208.3(b)(3) and Village of 
Palatine Ordinance 2-707(b)(3). 
114




 Id.  
117
 Id. at 924-25. 
118
 See 18 U.S.C.A. §2721(c) (requiring that redisclosure also be for one of the 
fourteen permitted purposes and that the rediscloser keep records of whom the 
information was released to for five years. Of course, it would be impossible for 
Palatine to accomplish this in the context of a parking ticket, which further supports 
the idea that it effects an impermissible redisclosure). 
119
 Senne, 645 F.3d at 926 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
21
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its use of Senne’s information was not protected by either the (b)(1) 
law enforcement function or (b)(4) service of process exceptions,
120
 as 
such information is “of no consequence” for the purpose of issuing a 
ticket.
121
 He accused the majority of “largely ignor[ing] … the very 
problem that Congress sought to address.”
122
 In adding the exceptions 
to the statute, Judge Ripple argued, Congress had attempted to strike a 
balance between an individual’s privacy and security interests and the 
legitimate operational needs of government, which the majority had 
misconstrued as “administrative convenience.”
123
 He argued that 
Congress had contemplated disclosures that were “reasonable” in 
effecting a permitted use, and to conclude otherwise would infer that it 
deliberately intended to frustrate the purpose of the statute.
124
 The 
information disclosed on Senne’s ticket bore “no reasonable 
relationship to the purpose” of the ticket, which is to notify a vehicle 
owner that he is financially liable for a violation:
125
 “Congress did not 
intend that the statutory exceptions be divorced, logically or 
practically, from the purpose of the statute . . . [w]e should not ascribe 
to Congress the intent to sanction the publication of any and all 
personal information through the invocation of an exception” 
(emphasis in original).
126
   
To support his position, Judge Ripple quoted Sen. Harkin on the 
subject of excessive disclosure:  
 
In appropriate circumstances, law enforcement agencies may 
reasonably determine that disclosure of this private 
information . . . will assist in carrying out the function of the 
                                                 
120
 Id. at 925. 
121
 Id. at 926. 
122
 Id. at 927. 
123
 Id. at 926-27. 
124
 Id. at 926. In response, Judge Flaum’s opinion faulted the dissent for not 
providing a “textual foundation for its interpretation of the statute, which Congress 
of course remains at liberty to amend.” Id. at n.1. 
125
 Id. (citing the Seventh Circuit’s previous holding in Saukstelis v. City of 
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Scathing in his criticism, Judge Ripple warned that the 
consequences of the majority’s decision were not theoretical: “An 
individual seeking to stalk or rape can go down a street where 
overnight parking is banned and collect the home address and personal 
information of women whose vehicles have been tagged … [t]he 
police, in derogation of the explicit intent of Congress, effectively 
[have] done his work for him in identifying potential victims.”
128
 He 
added that the revealing of home addresses was the most egregious 
form of unreasonable disclosure, as it was the exact thing Congress 
had sought to prevent.
129
 Moreover, the majority’s decision had given 
“shelter” to “less sophisticated police departments, more prone to 
bureaucratic convenience . . . consequently, their communities will 




Judge Ripple did not address in his dissent the 
disclosure/redisclosure argument raised by Senne, nor the plain 
meaning of “use,” but focused almost entirely on the intent and 
purpose of Congress. 
 
D. En Banc Rehearing 
 
On September 13, 2011, the Seventh Circuit granted Senne’s 
petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the panel decision.
131
 The 
en banc rehearing was held on February 9, 2012.
132
 In his petition, 
                                                 
127
 Id. at 926,  n.2 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S15958 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Harkin)). 
128
 Id. at 927. 
129
 Id. at 928. 
130
 Id.  
131
 Order, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011) (No. 10-3243). 
132
 En Banc Reh’g Oral Arguments, Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243 
(Feb. 9, 2012), Seventh Circuit Website: 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HA1FG9EH.mp3 (audio).  
23
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Senne argued that the court’s holding that Palatine’s practice was legal 
under state and local law characterizing parking citations as service of 
process was in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. 
Condon and the Seventh Circuit in Travis v. Reno.
133
 Those cases held 
that DPPA pre-empts conflicting state law.
134
 He reiterated his 
argument that the “for use” language in the DPPA exceptions clause 
was in itself limiting language that requires disclosures to be 
“reasonably necessary” to effect a permissible purpose, and that to 
allow Palatine’s practice under DPPA leads to “an absurd result.”
135
 
At the rehearing, the full court appeared split on whether 
Palatine’s practice met the requirements for permissible use.
136
 Judge 
Richard Posner accused Senne of asking the court to create a “gigantic 
jurisprudence” in connection with DPPA and suggested the law should 
instead be modified by Congress.
137
 Judge Posner expressed 
skepticism that members of the public would actually misuse the 
information printed on parking tickets.
138
 He and Judge Diane Sykes 
seemed to come down on the side of what Judge Ripple’s dissent had 
called “administrative convenience”
 
and defended the practice as an 
identification tool for the court.
 139
 If law enforcement can identify an 
offender in a charging document, Judge Sykes argued, then a parking 
ticket is no different from any charging document that initiates the 
court process.
140
 Municipal practices “vary from place to place,” she 
                                                 
133
 Petition of Plaintiff-Appellant for Reh’g at 1, Senne v. Village of Palatine, 
(7th Cir. July 25, 2011) (No. 10-3243 ), (arguing that the majority in any event had 
misapplied the state statute it relied upon, in that the statute does not actually equate 
a parking ticket with an administrative complaint or service of process. Id. at 8.). 
134
 Id. at 4-5. 
135
 Id. at 11. 
136




 Id. (asking Senne’s counsel “Have you noticed people wandering around 
and peeking under parking tickets?” and adding “your imagination is running 
wild.”). 
139
 Id.; Senne, 645 F.3d at 927 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
140
 En banc reh’g, supra note 132. 
24
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 Judge Ilana Rovner noted the absence of language in the Act 
requiring the use of only “necessary” information.
142
 Other judges said 
there are varying views of what is “reasonable.”
143
   
On the other hand, some of the judges raised the specter of the 
crimes that precipitated the Act’s passage and others such as identity 
theft.
144
 Judge Diane Wood was the harshest critic of the Village’s 
position.
145
 She allowed that name and address “might be pertinent” to 
a parking ticket, but not height, weight, sex or eye color, which “does 
not further service of process.”
146
 “Are there any limitations on how 
the information is used?” she demanded of Palatine.
147
 “Can you 
publish a person’s information in legal notices in a newspaper or on a 
website? I don't see why most of this information is necessary for 
serving process. I would think the way to read the statute is that 
[disclosing] each one of these [pieces of information] needs to be 
justified under the (b)(4) exemptions.”
148
 Palatine’s counsel argued 
that much of the personal information in question is publicly available 
for purchase anyway on such websites as Whitepages.com and 
Westlaw.
149
 However, Judge John Tinder noted that Illinois does not 
require such information to be included on a summons, and Judge 
David Hamilton asked about the “for use” phrase in (b)(4), expressing 












 Id. Judge Wood in particular hammered away on this point, invoking an 








 Id. Judge Wood suggested that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was not the 
proper stage of litigation to address the issues raised by both plaintiff and defendant, 
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III. SUPPORT FOR A NARROWER INTERPRETATION OF 
SUBSECTION 2721(B) 
 
A narrower interpretation of §2721(b), one that would allow relief 
for Jason Senne and the plaintiffs in the bulk distribution cases, is 
supported by court opinions and accepted canons of statutory 
construction. It is also supported by the Seventh Circuit’s own prior 
interpretations of DPPA and the powers of a law enforcement agency 
in enforcing motor vehicle laws. 
 
 A. Privacy Interests in Personal Identifying Information 
 
In Reno v. Condon, the only case in which the United States 
Supreme Court has considered DPPA, the Court did not address 
informational privacy issues.
151
 The Court has recognized an 
individual privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of certain personal 
matters,
152
 but not in one’s name, address, phone number or the other 
types of information typically contained in state motor vehicle 
records.
153
 However, the proliferation of technology to collect and 
disseminate information and its ramifications on privacy have caused 
concern to Congress and the courts.
154
 In Walls v. City of St. 
Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that: 
 
                                                 
151
 See Maginnis, supra note 71 at 820. 
152
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (recognizing a privacy 
interest in medical information).   
153
 See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998); Walls. v. City of St. 
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding a privacy interest in financial 
information, but not in information contained in public records, since there can be no 
expectation of privacy in it). 
154
 Walls, 895 F.2d at 194-95. See also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605,  and U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764, 
770 (1989), discussed infra pp. 27-28. 
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technological advances have provided society with the ability 
to collect, store, organize, and recall vast amounts of 
information about individuals in sophisticated computer  
files . . . Although some of this information can be useful and 
even necessary to maintain order and provide communication 
and convenience in a complex society, we need to be ever 
diligent to guard against misuse. Some information still needs 
to be private, disclosed to the public only if the person 




In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court warned of “the threat to 
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive government 
files . . . much of which is personal in character and potentially 
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.”
156
 In dicta that has particular 
significance to the issues raised with DPPA, the Court reasoned that 
the right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by “a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures . . . [r]ecognizing that in some circumstances 
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution ”.
157
 Here, it can be 
argued that although Palatine had the right to obtain and use Senne’s 
data to enforce its parking laws, it also had a statutory duty under 
DPPA to avoid unwarranted disclosure of his information. 
Writing for the majority in United States Department of Justice v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Justice John Paul 
Stevens expanded on the dicta of Whalen: “The compilation of 
otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest 




 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. Also see Maginnis, supra note 73 at 817 (arguing 
that a compilation of information about an individual –such as name, address, social 
security number, etc. –is more dangerous in the wrong hands than a single piece of 
information, since someone can more easily use a collection of information to 
impersonate an individual or do other harm). 
157
 Id. (emphasis added) . See also id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The 
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the 
potential for abuse of that information ...”). 
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implicated by disclosure of that information … [in Whalen we held] 
only that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit such a 
compilation.”
158
 Justice Stevens noted that even though “in an 
organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or 
another divulged to another,” the Court has recognized “the privacy 
interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye,” including 
“the nondisclosure of certain information even where [it] may have 
been at one time public.”
159
  
In Wolfe v. Schaefer, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Whalen to 
recognize a “constitutional right to the privacy of medical, sexual, 
financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal  
information . . . that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers,” 
which is “defeasible only upon proof of a strong public interest in 
access to or dissemination of the information.”
 160
 However, that case 
dealt mainly with a plaintiff’s personal reputation.
161
 In Best v. Berard, 
a 2011 DPPA case also before Judge Kennelly of the Northern District, 
the defendants, producers of a reality police television show, argued 
that the plaintiff, who was filmed being pulled over and arrested, had 
no right of privacy in her driver’s license number because it is publicly 
available information.
162
 The plaintiff countered that the Supreme 
Court “foreclosed” this argument in Reporters Committee because of 
its reasoning that a “compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain 
information” may be entitled to heightened privacy protection even 
though it consists only of “public records that might be found after a 
diligent search.”
163
 Judge Kennelly, however, observed that Reporters 
Committee was limited to interpreting the Freedom of Information Act 
and therefore did not address an expectation of privacy under the 
                                                 
158
 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 770 . 
159
 Id. at 763, 767, 769. 
160




 Best v. Berard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131572, 1-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 
2011). The court did not address the right of privacy under DPPA because the 
defendants argued they did not knowingly disclose under the Act, an argument the 
court rejected. 
163 
Id. at 10 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767). 
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 “[The plaintiff] does not . . . identify any other basis 
for a contention that she has a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest in [her drivers license number].”
165
 The plaintiff’s citing of the 
Seventh Circuit’s Wolfe v. Schaefer reasoning also failed to convince 
the judge, who concluded: “The categories of information that the 
Seventh Circuit has deemed protected by the constitutional privacy 
right have been far more personal, such that their disclosure would 




 B. Statutory Interpretation: Plain Meaning and the “Whole 
Statute” Rule 
 
With no express recognition of a privacy interest in personal 
information contained in public records from either the Supreme Court 
or Seventh Circuit, any protection of that right must be statutory. 
Congress likely enacted DPPA to protect these interests partly because 
constitutional law, at present, does not. This section analyzes how 
various constructions of DPPA can support a finding for Jason Senne 
and hold Palatine’s policy violative of his rights under the Act.  
 
 1. Literal Interpretation 
 
DPPA’s congressional supporters made clear that privacy and 
safety concerns were the driving force behind the legislation.
167
 
                                                 
164
Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 284 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
165
 Id. at 11. 
166
 Id. at 9 (citing cases involving HIV infection and use of prescription drugs). 
167
 See Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 
2; See also 140 CONG. REC. H2527 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Goss): “[T]he intent of this bill is simple and straightforward: We want to stop 
stalkers from obtaining the name and address of their prey before another tragedy 
occurs ... The [DPPA] balances the legitimate public and business interests in 
keeping these records available with an individual driver's right to privacy”; and 
statement of Rep. Morella: “Allowing a government agency to aid stalkers in 
locating those they are harassing is untenable.” 
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Although Judge Ripple accused the Senne majority of frustrating the 
purpose and intent of Congress through a rigid reading of “for use in 
… service of process,” a pure textual reading still supports a finding 
for Senne.
168
 “The plain language of the statute [is] the best indication 
of Congressional intent”
169
 and in this endeavor the court looks to a 
word or phrase’s “common, ordinary and accepted meaning,” 
sometimes consulting dictionary definitions and general word 
usage.
170
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “for use” as “for the benefit 
or advantage of another.” 
171
 Merriam-Webster defines “use” as a verb: 
“(a) to put into action or service; avail oneself of (employ); (b) to carry 
out a purpose or action by means of ”; and as a noun: “the act or 
practice of employing something.”
172
 Palatine’s act of placing drivers’ 
private information on vehicles does not put that information “into 
action or service” in collecting parking fines, nor is Palatine 
“employing” it to collect fines, nor does it “benefit or advantage” 
Palatine in collecting fines. The Village can accomplish that by 
communicating directly with the offender privately. Further, even if 
the plain meaning of “use” were so all-encompassing as to allow for 
Palatine’s actions, it would run afoul of the accepted judicial axiom 
that a statute should be applied according to its plain meaning except 
when it produces absurd results.
173
 
A plain language reading of subsection (c) of the Act, along with 
Senne’s holding that Palatine’s ticket policy amounts to a “disclosure,” 
justifies the conclusion that Palatine, as an “authorized recipient,” is 
                                                 
168
 See Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (if text is clear, court won’t 
look at legislative history); See also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:1 
(7th ed.) (“the starting point in statutory construction
 
is to read and examine the text 
of the act and draw inferences concerning the meaning from its composition and 
structure.”). 
169
 Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. City of 
Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 249 (2005). 
170
 Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:1. 
171
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 567 (Abridged 9th ed. 2010). 
172
 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/use (last accessed May 3, 2012). 
173
 Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:1. 
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actually redisclosing the information to the public, which it may not do 




 2. The ‘Whole Statute’ Rule 
 
A more appropriate reading of the DPPA exceptions clause would 
be under the “whole statute rule,” which provides that “[a] statute is 
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one 
general purpose and intent,” therefore “each part should be construed 
in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious 
whole.”
175
 Thus, interpretation should not be confined to the one 
section to be construed (as the courts have done with §2721(b)), 
because “a statutory subsection may not be considered in a 
vacuum.”
176
 The Supreme Court expressed this “cardinal rule” in King 
v. St. Vincent’s Hospital: “[A] statute is to be read as a whole, since the 
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”
177
 
Under “whole statute” construction it is impossible to consider the 
legislative scheme of DPPA and interpret “for use” in the manner the 
Seventh Circuit did in Senne and other recent federal court decisions 
have interpreted it.  
In the 1943 case SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that ultimately, “courts will construe the details of 
an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read 
text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the 
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular 
cases the generally expressed legislative policy.”
178
  
                                                 
174
 See 18. U.S.C.A. §2721(c); Senne, 645 F.3d at 923. 
175
 Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:5. See also U.S. Nat’l. Bank of Oregon 
v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993): “Over and over we 
have stressed that ‘in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single 
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and 
to its object and policy.’”  
176
 Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:5. 
177
 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (internal citations 
omitted). 
178
 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–351 (1943). 
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 3. Ambiguity in Subsection (b) and Absurd Results 
 
An argument may also be made that the “for use in” language in 
subsection (b) is in fact ambiguous, given the disparity in how 
different courts, and dissenting opinions within those courts, have 
interpreted its meaning. A statute is considered ambiguous when it is 
susceptible to differing interpretations.
179
 When a statute’s language is 
ambiguous and applying it according to its plain meaning would lead 
to an absurd result,
 
or there is clear evidence of contrary legislative 




The legislative history of DPPA as contained in congressional 
statements discussed supra points to an absurd result in recent federal 
appeals court applications. Moreover, the freedom of municipal 
agencies in initiating proceedings against individuals, as championed 
by the Senne majority and several judges at the en banc hearing, is not 
threatened by limiting those agencies’ use of personal information to 
what is objectively reasonable. Rep. Porter Goss, a supporter of DPPA, 
addressed this “balancing” of interests at a House debate: “[The Act] 
does not prohibit legitimate business, law enforcement and 
governmental access to such information. The flow of information 




The Seventh Circuit has already stated that it would not employ a 
literal interpretation of DPPA in a way that leads to an absurd result.
182
 
In Lake v. Neal, a 2009 DPPA case before the court, Judge Evans 
wrote for the majority: “Finally, we would not accept [plaintiff’s] 
argument even if a literal interpretation of the DPPA would seem to 
                                                 
179
 See Sutherland, supra note 172. 
180
 Id.; Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986).  
181
 140 CONG. REC. H2527 (statement of Rep. Goss) (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994). 
182
 Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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compel it because that would ‘lead to an absurd result.’”
183
 In the same 
opinion, the court acknowledged the Act’s legislative history: 
“Congress passed the DPPA in response to safety and privacy 
concerns stemming from the ready availability of personal information 
contained in state motor vehicle records.”
184
 Displaying a person’s 
name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number in a way that 
the information may be viewed by strangers who have no legitimate 
interest in it can be interpreted as an absurd result in light of the 
statute’s expressed purpose.    
 
 1.  Saukstelis v. City of Chicago 
 
The Seventh Circuit—in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, who 
was in the Senne majority—has already found that a license plate 
number alone is sufficient to identify an offender for authorities.
185
 In 
Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs challenged the city’s 
practice of applying the Denver boot to vehicles that had accumulated 
a certain number of parking tickets.
186
 They argued that because the 
citations included their vehicle tag numbers but not their names, they 
were not given proper notice.
187
 Rejecting this argument, the court 
found that a tag number was sufficient in itself to identify a vehicle’s 
owner without name:   
 
Parking tickets effectively say: ‘Chicago, Plaintiff, versus 
Owner of the vehicle with License No. xxxx, Defendant.’ 
That identifies the parties to the suit even better than a name 
does. Only one person matches a given license plate, while 
there are many “John Smiths.” … A license number uniquely 
                                                 
183
 Id. (Plaintiffs claimed violation of DPPA because information contained in 
their voter registration records had been disclosed; the court held they could not rely 
on DPPA just because plaintiffs had registered to vote at the DMV at the time they 
applied for their drivers licenses.) 
184
 Id. (emphasis added). 
185
 Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1991). 
186
 Id. at 1172-73. 
187
 Id. at 1174. 
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identifies the person. And Chicago mails notices directly to 




Given that the Seventh Circuit has expressed an intent not to 
interpret DPPA so as to produce an absurd result, has acknowledged its 
legislative purpose, and has concluded that a parking offender can be 
properly identified through his license plate number, it could easily 
interpret “for use in serving process” in such a way as to find 
Palatine’s policy impermissible under §2721(b). 
 
 
 C. Wiles v. Worldwide, Judge Ripple’s Dissent, and the Risk of 
Identity Theft 
 
One of Palatine’s arguments at the February 9, 2012, en banc 
hearing was that DPPA was enacted before Internet use became 
widespread, and that the easy access to information about people on 
the World Wide Web has made the nondisclosure provisions of DPPA 
largely irrelevant.
189
 Even accepting this argument, one generally still 
must be looking for a particular individual on the Internet, and one 
must already know at a minimum the person’s name, and sometimes 
more. Under Palatine’s parking citation policy, a stalker could follow 
an attractive woman until she receives a ticket, copy the information 
on it, and learn who she is, where she lives, and how old she is. If he 
went directly to the state licensing authority, even if he somehow 
learned her name, his request for more information about her would be 
denied. An identity thief could copy information from a parking ticket 
on any luxury car, assume that it belongs to an affluent individual, and 
possess enough information to open a credit account in that person’s 
name. 




 En banc reh’g, supra note 132. 
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According to the Federal Trade Commission, up to nine million 
Americans have their identities stolen each year.
190
 Common methods 
employed by identity thieves are rummaging through dumpsters to 
find discarded bills and other documents with personal identifying 
information, and stealing wallets.
191
 They then use the information to 
open credit card accounts, bank accounts, and utility accounts in the 
unsuspecting victim’s name, sometimes even fraudulently filing 
bankruptcy.
192
 The information revealed to a potential identity thief on 
Palatine’s parking ticket is the same information the thief would find 
on a person’s driver’s license retrieved from a wallet. There is also the 
possibility that a person’s vehicle could be stolen and receive a 
parking ticket while in the thief’s possession, giving the thief a 
windfall of private information.  
The narrow interpretation of the DPPA exceptions proposed by 
the Missouri district court in Wiles v. Worldwide and in Judge Ripple’s 
dissent in Senne should be adopted by the Seventh Circuit and other 
federal courts in determining what disclosures and uses are 
permissible under DPPA.
193
 This approach reasons that “the 
interpretation most consistent with congressional intent requires that 
disclosure of personal information be narrowly tailored to a specific 
permissible purpose.”
194
 Under this view, the “for use” language in the 
exceptions clause would be interpreted as a use reasonable in carrying 
out the user’s purpose. It would not prevent any law enforcement or 
other municipal agency from obtaining a registered vehicle owner’s 
identity from a state, only require that they limit their use to that 
necessary to their purpose. They should not redisclose the information 
to another—whether identified or, in the case of Senne, unidentified—
unless the new recipient also has a permissible purpose under 
                                                 
190
 Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, About Identify Theft, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft//consumers/about-






 See Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d 1059 et seq.; Senne, 645 F.3d at 926 (Ripple, J., 
dissenting). 
194
 Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1076. 
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 This approach would balance the personal privacy and 
safety concerns behind the Act’s passage with the legitimate needs of 
government. A more restrictive reading of what uses should be 
allowed under the exceptions in DPPA would be in keeping with the 




With recent federal interpretation of DPPA—from the Seventh 
Circuit in Senne, the Fifth Circuit in Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Thomas, along with lower court rulings—DPPA’s exceptions clause 
threatens to weaken and even devour the protections Congress 
intended to give drivers in the Act. However, legislative history, 
minority judicial DPPA interpretations, long-established canons of 
statutory construction, and Supreme Court dicta on informational 
privacy point to an alternative application that courts should follow if 
the safeguards in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act are not to 
become meaningless.  
 
                                                 
195
 See §2721(c) on redisclosure. 
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